The End of Pax Zenawi in Somalia
Alemayehu G. Mariam
October 6, 2008

Quitting Time in Somalia

The situation in Somalia has turned Code Red. Things are deteriorating
very fast for Zenawi's troops. The Al-Shabaab “jihadists” have taken over
southern Somalia, and are ravenously eyeing Mogadishu. It is no longer
“hit-and-run” guerrilla warfare. It is capture-and-stay. They have captured
Kisimayo, a southern port town. They are staying. They are being “flooded
with money” from supporters and backers throughout the Middle East.
They have shut down the Mogadishu airport. Now they are vowing to do
the same with the sea ports. The 2500 or so African Union peacekeepers
from Uganda and Burundi are holed up in their garrisons in Mogadishu as
the insurgents rain rocket-propelled grenades on them at will. Bombings,
assassinations, piracy, kidnappings and hostage-taking are a daily fact of
life in Somalia. There are no viable political solutions. The cost of the war
both in terms of human lives and resources has become unbearable for
Ethiopia, and Somalia. Zenawi's forces are in full “strategic retreat” to
Mogadishu. After nearly two years of intervention and occupation of
Somalia, there are no signs of success; and an anniversary of total failure
in the quicksand of Somalia awaits Zenawi this coming December. Could
this be the end of Pax Zenawi in Somalia?

Zenawi realizes the jig is up in Somalia. For the past several weeks, he and
his officials have been consistently dropping hints and insinuations of
withdrawal. In his Ethiopian “new year” video interview last month, Zenawi
declared triumphantly that he had fully achieved his primary objective of
destroying and neutralizing the “jihadist” threat to Ethiopia. Success in
stabilizing the Somali transitional government and bringing some measure
of peace and reconciliation was “not 100 percent”. But Somalia is ready to
host international peacekeepers, and he is ready to take out his troops.
For Zenawi, the question is not whether to withdraw from Somalia, but
“whether keeping Ethiopian forces in Somalia in the longer term would
make a difference”? In other words, Zenawi wants out ASAP, but he needs
to save face. He wants the U.N., the African Union or some other
peacekeeping body to take over so that he can say he stabilized and
brought peace to Somalia and is now withdrawing victoriously and
honorably. That is unlikely to happen because there is no one out there
willing to help him cover up the folly of his quixotic, imperial and hubristic
misadventures in Somalia. Zenawi has no place to run but face the music.

The Way It Was…

Back in mid-December 2006, Zenawi denied any direct military involvement
in Somalia. In an interview with the Washington Post, Zenawi explained
that he had sent a few hundred soldiers into Somalia to provide training.
“It is true we have troops in Baidoa, the capital, who are there to train
forces of the transitional federal government, who are an internationally
recognized government and who have officially asked for support from
Ethiopia. . . . Now, if the transitional government does not want our
trainers, we'd be happy to withdraw them. . .” He warned that “There is a
group in the Islamic Movement in Mogadishu that is not interested in
democratic secular government in Somalia, that is hell-bent on establishing
a Taliban regime in Somalia. Now, you can facilitate the Talibanization of
Somalia through dialogue. If that is the intention, it perhaps makes
sense….” In early January, 2007, a triumphant Zenawi declared that his
forces would remain in Somalia “for a few weeks” while the transitional
government stabilizes the situation. “It is up to the international
community to deploy a peacekeeping force in Somalia without delay to
avoid a vacuum and a resurgence of extremists and terrorists.”

In May, 2007, Zenawi told Al Jazeera that he was not only providing
training in Somalia, he had been invited by the transitional government to
assist in fighting terrorists. “I think we should get the facts straight first.
We did not invade Somalia. We were invited by the duly constituted
government of Somalia, internationally recognized government of Somalia
to assist them in averting the threat of terrorism. We did so.” Even though
he had argued at the outset of the invasion that Somalia was the central
front in the battle against Al Queida and international terrorism in the Horn
of Africa, he denied any U.S. role in the invasion: “We did not fight a proxy
war on behalf of the United States. Indeed, the United States was very
ambivalent about our intervention, once we intervened of course the United
States and much of the international community was supportive but in the
initial phase before we intervened, everybody, including the United States
was warning us that we might walk into a trap and a quagmire and that we
should think twice before taking steps.” In October, 2007, he told his
parliament: “So, rushing to pull out the army immediately would have
entailed a situation for the already dismantled forces of terror in Somalia to
regroup, and thereby to render void the sacrifices already made by the
Ethiopian army.”

The Way it Is Now….

Today, things are going downhill in Somalia, and getting worse by the day.
The Somali jihadist-talibanist-terrorists refuse to be vanquished. They have
launched an Iraq-style insurgency. The civilian war casualty continues to
increase by the day. An estimated 20,000 Somalis have died, mostly
civilians, since the invasion. Over 1 million Somalis have been displaced.
Upwards of 5 thousand of Zenawi's troops are estimated to have been
killed or severely injured in the Somali war. Amnesty International has
documented massive human rights violations by Zenawi's troops in Somalia
including extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, beatings, arbitrary detentions,
forced disappearances and collective punishments. Zenawi says it is all a
“total fabrication”. There is no accountability for what Zenawi does in
Somalia. As one opposition leader recently complained, “The government
has irresponsibly refused to account on these two pertinent issues relating
to the Ethiopian army's deployment to Somalia. Every country's parliament,
even the public at large, has a right to know what its involvement is costing
in terms of life and resources. We have been kept in the dark.” Under
Zenawi's watch, the “jhihadists” and “terrorists” in Somalia have not only
grown stronger militarily, they have also expanded into new fields of
terroristic operations. The Somali coast has become Piracy Central.
Carrying cell phones, RPGs, speedboats and assorted small arms, the high
tech Somali pirates are making it hazardous for commercial navigation on
the Indian Ocean. Last week Zenawi complained: “We are very concerned
about the level of piracy on the seas. It is related to the instability in
Somalia. They could be used to destabilize the region and the whole
situation on the high seas is a matter of great concern for all of us. We
very much hope the international community will respond.” His foreign
minister last week called upon the U.N. to deploy peacekeepers in Somalia
“as soon as possible” or provide resources to strengthen the current
African Union mission.

The Somali war has never been popular in Ethiopia. Unlike the war in Iraq,
there was no one in Ethiopia who was for the Somali war before they were
against it. Everybody was against it. Now there is even talk that “Ethiopia's
fractious political opposition is planning a unified parliamentary campaign to
demand a complete withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia.” VOA
reported recently that “opposition parties” have sent a letter to Zenawi
“saying the sacrifice of lives and scarce financial resources had become
unbearable.” Bulcha Mideksa stated matter-of-factly that the Somalis
“resolved to fight against us, and they are fighting, and in my opinion they
are winning.” But Zenawi's official policy remains: “We can get out any time.
We will not. We are not in a quagmire. But we cannot abandon the
transitional government and Somali people. We have to see progress in
reconciliation so we do not want to abandon them in middle of crisis in
Somalia.”

Pax Zenawi (Zenawi's Peace)

Zenawi's invasion of Somalia was reckless and irresponsible. He glibly
assured the world at the beginning of the invasion, “we will be out in a few
weeks.” Now he realizes that the business of war is unpredictable,
expensive and uncertain. After nearly two years, he has found that the
Somali war has sapped the strength of his troops and depleted the limited
resources of the country; and he has no diplomatic leverage over the
various warring Somali elements to impose his quixotic vision of a Pax
Zenawi on the Somali people which he can manipulate through a puppet
client regime.

It is really hard to imagine what Zenawi had in mind where he decided to
invade Somalia. From his public statements, one can infer that he must
have had visions of a mini-empire in the Horn. He certainly had
megalomaniacal visions of bringing peace, freedom and stability to Somalia
(something he has been unable to bring to his own country over the past
17 years). He seems to have envisioned himself as a “Supercop” with the
self-appointed responsibility of keeping law and order in the Horn. In
December, 2006, he asserted a unilateral right to act as a Horn policeman
and contain terrorism, and casually invited the world to join him after he
kicked the rear ends of the “jihadists” in “a few weeks”. The potential
implications of a Pax Zenawi in Somalia are as dangerous as they are
laughable. Today Zenawi finds himself in Somalia like the frontier marshal
portrayed by Gary Cooper in “High Noon” facing some nasty and wicked
outlaws without help from the townsfolk. He stands alone against a vicious
phantom “jihadist” enemy; and none of the Somali townsfolk, the Ethiopian
people or the international community wants to help him fight them.

The fact of the matter is that Somalis are not interested in any peace
imposed upon them by Zenawi. The gift of secular government Zenawi
wants to offer the Somalis has few takers. For the last 17 years, the
Somalis have been unable to come to terms with the basic facts of their
national life. Maybe they prefer tribal and clan associations over an elected
democratic national government. Maybe they'd rather have a theocratic
state than a secular transitional government whose authority is more
widely denied and held in contempt than recognized. They regard the
members of the transitional government as collaborators. It's up to them
what they want. It is not up to Zenawi to impose upon them. Yet in his
recent statements, Zenawi is implicitly threatening the international
community that if they don't send troops and/or provide resources, he
may just quit and walk out. That would presumably embolden the Al-
Shabaab and the local and foreign Islamist extremists; and Somalia would
be swiftly consumed in a civil war and become an incubator for terrorists.
That was the same plea he made back in December 2006. It is falling on
deaf ears now. For nearly two years, he has been begging for more African
Union for troops, and with the exception of Uganda and Burundi, none of
the estimated 6,000 AU troops are likely to show up. The lame duck Bush
Administration is bogged down with its own problems. Nobody seems to
care much about the anticipated consequences Zenawi's withdrawal from
Somalia.

Zenawi's dilemma in getting out of Somalia revolves around several issues:
First, he believes that if he withdraws “precipitously” there will be civil war in
Somalia. That is not convincing as Somalis have been in a state of clan
wars, virtual civil wars, since the fall of the Barre regime in 1991. Second,
an immediate or even a phased withdrawal will encourage and embolden the
“jihadists” terrorist. The “jihadists” are already emboldened by the fact that
they now virtually control most of southern Somalia. The only thing the
continued occupation will do is increase their determination to get rid of the
occupation forces. Third, the security and military capability of the
transitional government must be strengthened or it will be overrun by
Islamist forces. The problem with that argument is that it will take years to
enhance the military capability and combat readiness of the transitional
government forces. There are issues of clan loyalty, shifting clan alliances
and resources that make such a thing nearly impossible. Fourth, an
unscheduled withdrawal will undermine “Ethiopia's credibility” and expose
“our supporters in Somalia” to extreme danger, and damage the morale of
Zenawi's troops. Those supporters are in extreme danger now as attempts
are being made almost daily to assassinate and attack them. The war has
no popular support and morale has been down from the beginning. If
Zenawi's troops were given a choice between staying in Somalia and
fighting a losing war or risking damage to their morale, they would take the
latter, as would the Ethiopian people.

The painful fact is that invasion of Somalia was not in the national interest
of Ethiopia. The invasion was illegal under international law and a colossal
political mistake. It was morally wrong to invade a country and cause so
much civilian death and displacement. At the time of the invasion, Somalia
was in no position to militarily threaten Ethiopia. Today, the
counterinsurgency is getting tougher by the day and is recruiting more
fighters. It seems increasingly clear that it is well-funded and well-equipped
to inflict maximum damage and sustain the insurgency for a very long time.
The only real option is getting out of Somalia immediately and without
preconditions.

No Exit Strategy

There are no good options left for Zenawi. His dream of creating a stable,
pluralist, democratic, unitary state with strong constitutional protections in
Somalia is as real as the mirages in the Somali desert. He has not been able
to create a pluralist democratic society in Ethiopia in 17 years; it is unlikely
he could do so in Somalia in 2 years. He also seems to have overplayed his
hand in Somalia in trying to use the same old divide-and-rule strategy that
has worked for him so well in Ethiopia. He found out that Somali history
and the history of Ethiopian-Somali relationship can not be undone by a
wave of the magic wand of divide-and-rule.

At this late stage in the game, Zenawi's choices are limited. First, he can
withdraw immediately, a strategy less affectionately known as “cut and
run”. That would be the most rational thing to do. In other words, cut your
losses in a lost war and run for the border. Zenawi says that would plunge
Somalia into civil war and expose the transitional government to certain
doom. But what he needs to realize is that much of the violence, insecurity
and instability in Somalia today is a direct reaction to his occupation forces
and his support for the transitional regime. Somalia has also been in a
state of anarchy since 1991. Immediate withdrawal will more likely result in
a decline in violence than a spike in it. The way things are shaping now,
Zenawi will be forced to cut and run from Somalia. Analysis of his recent
public statements seem to suggest that he is slowly building up courage to
do just that. A phased withdrawal may also be an option. Perhaps a
reassurance that occupying forces will leave Somalia might bring the
warring factions together to hammer out a working arrangement.

His second option is to continue the occupation, that is an open-ended
anti-jihadist counter-terrorism mission that will prove to be increasingly
bloody, costly, and counterproductive. But even that is becoming more
difficult as the “jhihadists” retake and control more territory and tighten
the noose on Mogadishu. There are few occupied areas in Somalia where
Zenawi's forces or the transitional government can enforce their political
rule, exercise civil authority and/or maintain law and order. If there exists
any “government” in Somalia at all, it seems to exist in the form of non-
political traditional social institutions such as clan elders, tribal militias,
religious clerics, etc. Generally, the anecdotal data from composite news
and published intelligence sources shows that Zenawi's troops can no
longer operate as an effective occupation force. They have been forced to
abandon towns and strategic locations and go into virtual “force protection
mode”. They remain in their fortified bases and are making little effort to go
out and aggressively pursue the “jihadist terrorists”. They have been
effectively neutralized by the “jihadists”.

Third, Zenawi can work to intensify regional/international diplomatic
offensives. The problem is that no one seems to be interested. The AU has
been unable to deliver on the promised peacekeepers and the U.N. has not
been able to provide much more than moral support. So far he has only
been able to engage in a diplomatic parlor game accusing opponents,
“jihadists” and others of distorting his intentions and aims. He has not
been able to get real commitment for a power sharing arrangement among
the various factions. For whatever reasons, the Somalis do not appear
interested in diplomatic solutions engineered by Zenawi.

Fourth, dump the transitional government and work with the “jihadists”.
The fact of the matter is that the transitional government exists in name
only. It can not provide the most basic functions and services. It has few
units with any capability for sustained combat operations. It is unlikely that
the government's troops can be trained and equipped in such large
numbers to become an effective fighting force in their own right in the
foreseeable future. There is not much evidence to suggest that the forces
of the transitional government are contributing significantly to the fight
against the insurgents. It is also unlikely that Somali clan and militia leaders
will make difficult compromises so long as there are foreign troops on their
soil. Religious and nationalist opposition is on the rise and there is no
support for the occupation forces and very little for the transitional
government. After nearly two years of fighting in Somalia, it is clear that
the insurgents are at least as strong now as they ever have been, and
most likely much stronger as they now control large swaths of the country.
Maybe it's time to talk to them and cut a deal; perhaps cobble together a
basis for a very loose “national” government and carve out territories for
the various clan leaders to administer on their own. Then leave Somalia!

Fifth, Zenawi can maintain a prolonged strategic stalemate with the
“jihadists”. Obviously, this is a very risky strategy. The presence of foreign
troops in Somalia will always provoke resistance; and at best Zenawi can
expect a bloody stalemate that will result in more civilian deaths, military
casualties and incur huge costs. But it may be possible to continue to
mount selective operations to keep pressure on the insurgents.

End Game: Time to Get the Hell Out of Dodge

The questions Zenawi needs to face are clear: Is Ethiopia or the
international community safer from the threats of terrorism today than in
December 2006? If he disengages, will Somalia be plunged into its former
state of clan warfare (civil war) and politics? In as much as Zenawi has tried
to fan the flames of terrorism in the Horn to get international support for
his interventionary actions, support for his dictatorship in Ethiopia and
avert sanctions for his massive human rights violations, his strategy for
war and peace in Somalia has failed completely. As the old saying goes,
“You can start a war whenever you want, but you can not stop it whenever
you want.” That is Zenawi's problem: How can he stop the war and get out
of Somalia? The ultimate question is how to help Zenawi withdraw from
Somalia without losing face, not how many Ethiopians or Somalis are dying
or displaced. It is unlikely that he will admit defeat and error and pull the
troops out. That is just not going to happen. The invasion of Somalia was
a colossal misadventure. There will be no peace with honor to exit out of
Somalia. Zenawi will leave Somalia in disgrace in six months, one year or
however long it takes. That is the price of arrogance and hubris. As
Scriptures teach: “When pride comes, then comes disgrace.” And “pride
goes before destruction, and haughtiness before a fall.” (Proverbs 11:2, 16:
18.)

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The writer, Alemayehu G. Mariam, is a professor of political science at
California State University, San Bernardino, and an attorney based in Los
Angeles. For comments, he can be reached at almariam@gmail.com